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RECENT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Giaccio offers a deserved reprimand
to a practice of criminal practice conceived in obscurity. The imputation
of criminal conduct where none has been found to exist, only serves to
promote judicial hypocrisy. Thus the decision by the Supreme Court
marks the demise of a legislative and court created "quasi-crime." 20 It is
no longer possible for a Pennsylvania jury to impose costs on an acquitted
defendant "as a deserved rebuke, admonition or penalty for conduct not
sufficient to warrant a conviction."'" Yet the Giaccio decision does raise
a question of future jury reaction in cases involving first offenders. A
verdict of "not guilty and pay the costs" plus the silent admonition, "but
don't do it again"22 has in the past permitted first offenders to avoid the
stain of a criminal record. But, whether jurors will continue to allow a
first offender a second chance, absent the silent admonition, remains to be
seen. In this regard, the problems of the administration of criminal
justice in a system limited by the requirements of due process illustrate
the need for a pragmatic approach to the first offender issue. The aims
of the criminal law must be redirected from within the legal system to
accommodate both the demands of punishment and those of fundamental
fairness as correctional devices.
John F. Naughton
CoNTR1cTs-Signature on Instrument-The traditional view that one is
bound by his signature may be in jeopardy in Pennsylvania.
Herman v. Stern, 419 Pa. 272, 213 A.2d 594 (1965).
In a recent decision,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after discussing
at great length many unnecessary and irrelevant factors, with one Justice
concurring and three Justices dissenting, adhered to a basic principle of
contract law. It appears, from this case, that only a plurality of the court
is willing to hold that one is bound by what he signs. Others on the court,
without even mentioning this rule, seemed to be calling for a principle
which would in fact destroy this traditional view.
Richard B. Herman, a real estate broker, brought this action for a
commission allegedly earned through the sale of some real estate owned
by the defendant; James L. Stern. John J. Shaw, Jr., then lessee of the
premises in question, engaged the plaintiff, Herman, late in 1959 to find
a subtenant for the unexpired term of his lease.2 Herman found a sub-
wealth, 26 Pa. 171 (1856); Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 4 S. & R. 127 (Pa. 1818); Common-
wealth v. Giaccio, supra note 7.
20. See Commonwealth v. Donovan, 119 Pa. Super. 544, 181 At. 606 (1935).
21. Commonwealth v. Meany, 8 Pa. Super. 224, 226 (1898).
22. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, supra note 7, at 147, 202 A.2d at 60.
1. Herman v. Stern, 419 Pa. 272, 213 A.2d 594 (1965).
2. The term was not to expire until August 31, 1960.
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tenant, Roslyn Sailor, who also signed a new lease for an additional three-
year period. Plaintiff prepared both the sublease from Shaw to the new
tenant and the new lease from Stern to this same tenant.
Both leases, at paragraph 37(B), contained a usual provision for
rental collections by the plaintiff and a provision for commissions for this
service. This paragraph also provided:
In the event that, at any time while Lessee or any affiliate or
successor to or assignee of Lessee is in possession of the demised
premises . . . , the premises shall be sold to the Lessee, . . .
Principal agrees to pay to Richard B. Herman & Company, Inc.,
a commission of 5% of the sale price ... regardless of whether
or not Principal shall have obligated himself to pay a commission
on said sale to anyone else.
Both leases were signed by plaintiff as agent and by the tenant. At the
bottom of the lease appeared the following:
The principal of Richard B. Herman & Company, Inc., having
examined the above lease and agreements, hereby agrees to them
and ratifies and approves of the same in all particulars. [Em-
phasis added.]
The signature and seal of the defendant followed this statement.
In October, 1962, the premises were sold to the tenant and her husband.
Plaintiff sought a commission on the sale based on the above-mentioned
contents of paragraph 37(B). The defendant Stern contended, that
through error and mistake, this provision was not eliminated from the
printed form before being signed as no prior agreement was made with
Herman with respect to the payment of commissions in the event of any
sale.
Four opinions were filed by the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. In affirming the judgment below for the plaintiff, Justice O'Brien
spoke for himself, Chief Justice Bell, and Justice Musmanno. A con-
curring opinion was filed by Justice Roberts, while Justices Eagen and
Cohen filed separate dissenting opinions in which Justice Jones concurred.
Justice O'Brien, after disposing of the allegation of mistake by the
defendant,3 followed the traditional view that one is bound by what he
signs: 4
3. Justice O'Brien stated that "the bold assertion of error and mistake falls far short
of the requirement necessary for reformation of the contract." To substantiate his position,
he cited Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1019(b) which states: "Averments of fraud
or mistake shall be averred with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condi-
tions of mind may be averred generally."
4. Greenfield's Estate, 14 Pa. 489 (1850); General Refrigerator and Store Fixture
Company v. Fry, 393 Pa. 15, 141 A.2d 836 (1958); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 70 (1932).
[Vol. 4:47S
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Appellant [Stern] obligates himself in clear and unambiguous
language, for a recited consideration from the broker, under seal,
to pay specific commissions .... I
When appellant ratified and approved the document, he accepted
not only the lessee's offer, but also the appellee's offer ...'
Whether an oral discussion was had concerning the commission
in the event a sale took place between the parties is of no
moment in the face of the written argument in clear and unam-
biguous terms, there having been no allegation of fraud.'
Concurring, Justice Roberts confined himself to the problem of whether
or not a judgment on the pleadings should have been entered in favor of
the plaintiff. Roberts was of the opinion that the averments of the de-
fendant were insufficient to bar such judgment.8 Dissenting, Justice Cohen
held that the plaintiff, in relying solely upon the signed writing, failed to
aver facts sufficient to prove the existence of a contract. And, since
Herman was an agent of Stern, he had a duty to disclose the contents of
the lease regarding his fees." Justice Eagen, dissenting' and assuming the
validity of reverse unilateral contracts under Pennsylvania law, argued
that there had been no acceptance of the offer by the defendant, and,
under the particular facts of this case, "the signature of the defendant can
hardly be considered an unequivocal acceptance."'0
The basic problem facing the court, which caused its dilemma, was
whether or not one should be bound by his signAture on an instrument,
regardless of his knowledge of its contents. With few exceptions, the
accepted view" in Pennsylvania for over a century has been that enun-
ciated in Greenfield's Estate: 2
... if one who is about to execute an instrument can read it, and
neglects to do so; or being blind or illiterate, chooses to act with-
5. Herman v. Stern, supra note 1, at 283, 213 A.2d at 599.
6. Id. at 285, 213 A.2d at 600.
7. Ibid.
8. Supra note 3.
9. Justice Cohen stated: "It might be quite reasonable to bind the principal with
respect to promises made to the tenant in a lease which he has failed to read. But it is not
at all reasonable to hold that he should have reasonably understood without explicit dis-
closure, which is not here alleged, that a document such as that involved in the instant
case was also an offer by his agent regarding fees. Requiring agents to bargain at arm's
length for their compensation in a manner distinguishable from the performance of their
fiduciary duties is not burdensome and is in accord with sound agency principles." Herman v.
Stern, supra note 1, at 298, 213 A.2d at 607-08.
10. Id. at 300, 213 A.2d at 603.
11. Johnston v. Patterson, 114 Pa. 398, 6 At. 746 (1886); Cosgrove v. Woodward, 49
Pa. Super. 228 (1912); General Refrigerator and Store Fixture Company v. Fry, supra
note 4.
12. 14 Pa. 489 (1850).
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out requiring the contents to be made known to him, he will be
bound to it, though it turn out to be contrary to his mind .... 11
This view was also adopted by the drafters of the Restatement. 4 The
basis for this rule at its inception and even more so today is the necessity
for stability in economic transactions. This underlying policy was clearly
expressed by the court in General Refrigerator and Store Fixture Co. v.
Fry:
1 5
The whole business structure of America would become a
shambles if signers in serious transactions were to be allowed to
repudiate their obligations on the basis that they did not know
what they were signing. The ever-constant possibility of such a
disavowal would turn into water the adhesive mortar of legal
responsibility holding together the bricks of every contractual
wall; such an accepted possibility would wreck every business
dealing at the slightest touch of the repudiator.' 6
A plurality of the court, speaking through Justice O'Brien, after an
extensive discussion of the facts and procedural issues, adopted this
traditional view. However, throughout his entire opinion, no mention
was made of this view, nor were there any references made to cases
in support of it. It appears, then, that Justice O'Brien in arriving at
his decision thought the problem too basic to warrant extensive dis-
cussion and citation.
Under this traditional view, Pennsylvania has recognized a few excep-
tions. The equitable principle of unconscionability was the first recognized
exception to the general rule. However, as of today, it is still a principle
applicable in Pennsylvania only in a court of equity in such circumstances
as defenses to suits for specific performance.' While this principle of
unconscionability is not applicable to actions at law, the court could have
extended its application to such actions as has been done recently in a few
jurisdictions.'" However, since the principle is usually applicable to situa-
tions where a party knowingly signs an unfair contract, 9 and since in the
case before us the defendant is claiming lack of knowledge of any con-
13. Id. at 496.
14. Supra note 4.
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 19, 141 A.2d at 838.
17. Friend v. Lamb, 152 Pa. 529, 25 At. 577 (1893) ; Byrne's Estate, 122 Pa. Super.
413, 186 Atl. 187 (1936); Norris' Estate, 329 Pa. 483, 198 At. 142 (1938); Merity v.
Circelli, 361 Pa. 239, 64 A.2d 796 (1949); Martinelli v. Dougherty, 4 D. & C.2d 315 (Pa.
1955).
18. See, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
19. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., supra note 18, at 449 discusses un-
conscionability to "include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."
[Vol. 4:475
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tract, even if the court would have considered the unconscionability prin-
ciple as now being applicable to actions at law, it is obvious that it would
have had no application to the facts in the instant case. Likewise, the
conclusion would have been the same had the court taken the alternate
route and extended the policy behind the unconscionability section of the
Uniform Commercial Code2° to transactions other than the sale of goods.2'
Another recognized exception to the traditional view in Pennsylvania
deals with one who unwittingly signs a document which contains a con-
fession of judgment clause. However, this exception is limited to situations
where the clause is hidden or otherwise removed from the body of the
writing. The court has stated in Cutler Corporation v. Latshaw22 that:
A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the most
powerful and drastic document known to civil law.... 23
The mere physical inclusion of such a warrant in a mass of fine
type verbiage on each reverse sheet does not of itself make it a
part of the contract.24
In the present case, Justice O'Brien distinguished Cutler on the grounds
that paragraph 3 7(B) was of the same size type as the rest of the agree-
ment and was contained within the body of the writing. Even if the court
desired to expand the Cutler principle from those cases involving con-
fession of judgment clauses to other vital rights and obligations, it is
doubtful that such an extension would include ordinary contractual
obligations, particularly where such obligations are contained in the body
of the writing in uniform print.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Cohen and Eagen seem to advocate
the creation of another exception to the traditional view. Although not
specifically called for by either Justice, a tendency toward the application
of a standard of reasonableness is evident in their opinions. Justice Cohen,
after considering the principal-agent relationship, actually discusses the
reasonableness of holding Stern liable on this contract.2 5 Justice Eagen
states:
In view of the type of promise asserted, the signature of the de-
fendant can hardly be considered an unequivocal acceptance.
This is particularly so where, as in the present case, the alleged
acceptance is incorporated or "slipped" into the agreement be-
tween the lessor and the third party.2 6
20. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-302; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-302 (1954).
21. See Note, 45 VA. L. Rxv. 583, 590 (1959) which discusses the possible extension of
the rule of § 2-302 by analogy to cases which involve contracts not specifically covered by
the section. See also GaismoE, CoNTRAcTs § 294 (Rev. Ed. Murray 1965).
22. 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
23. Id. at 4, 97 A.2d at 236.
24. Id. at 5, 97 A.2d at 236.
25. Supra note 9.
26. Herman v. Stern, supra note 1, at 300, 213 A.2d at 603.
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Justice Eagen obviously envisions cases where it would be unreasonable
to bind a party by his signature, this specific case being one of these situa-
tions. However, a standard of "reasonableness" would have an unstabiliz-
ing effect on the commercial system which has been so adequately
protected by the traditional view. It is submitted that a rule of "reason-
ableness" should not be considered by the Pennsylvania courts in the
future. Further, the courts should be very cautious about creating any new
exceptions to the traditional rule.
The traditional view and its exceptions are firmly established in Penn-
sylvania in clear and concise terms. The court, by discussing such a
multiplicity of topics and expressing such a wide diversity of opinion, has




INSURANCE-Total Disability-The concept of "total disability" is clari-
fied and expanded in Pennsylvania.
Cobosco v. Life Assurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 419 Pa. 158, 213 A.2d
369 (1965).
In September of 1965, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania redefined and
expanded, in Cobosco v. Life Assurance Company of Pennsylvania,' the
difficult insurance question of the meaning of the term "total disability."
The appellant, Mrs. Cobosco, was the owner of a hardware store. From
1951 until October, 1960, the time of her disabling accident, she ran the
store almost entirely by herself. She worked eight to ten hours a day, six
days a week. The only assistance she received was from her son, who
made occasional deliveries, and from an employee who handled the
heavier merchandise.
In October of 1960, Mrs. Cobosco fractured her right femur and was
hospitalized. Two months later, she sustained the same injury and re-
entered the hospital. Almost a year after the original accident, Mrs.
Cobosco fell, this time twisting her right leg. As a result of these accidents,
Mrs. Cobosco suffered a permanent shortening of her right leg and a
permanent "foot drop."' She could not drive a car, walk without a cane,
1. 419 Pa. 158, 213 A.2d 369 (1965). The opinion of the court was written by Mr.
Justice Cohen. Mr. Chief Justice Bell dissented but did not file an opinion.
2. A "foot drop" is the inability to raise the foot. It is caused by a direct blow to the
sciatic nerve in the leg. The muscles of the calf, and the muscles on the lateral aspect of the
shin-bone become wasted and flabby. The hamstring muscle on the back side of the
thigh and the muscles of the buttocks may also become atrophied or flabby. The amount
of paralysis and weakness depends upon the site and the amount of injury to the nerve.
[Vol. 4:480
